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Civil Disobedience:
The Problem of Selective Obedience to Law
By STEVEN R. SCHLESINGER*
Introduction
Civil disobedience is illegal activity undertaken to protest laws that
are regarded as unjust.- It is characterized by open, i.e., nonclandes-
tine, violation of the law being protested or of other laws.2 In either
event its purpose, according to its advocates, is to effect change in the
law by calling public attention to the claimed injustice and by creating
the kind of tension or crisis in the community that is conducive to the
desired change.3 Most, though not all, of its proponents insist that acts
of civil disobedience must be nonviolent and accompanied by a willing-
ness to accept the legal penalty. An act of civil disobedience should be
distinguished from one that tests the constitutionality of a law; the latter
is predicated on a willingness to submit to the ultimate verdict of the
legal system. Civil disobedience, on the other hand, is defiance of the
law regardless of whether the act itself will be vindicated through legal
process. 4
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, Camden, New
Jersey.
1. A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENcE 49 (1968) [herein-
after cited as FORTAS].
2. For example, Fortas states that the term civil disobedience applies not only to
the refusal to obey a law because of disapproval of that law, but also to the refusal to
obey a law as a means of protesting some other law. The latter form of civil
disobedience attempts to accomplish purposes unrelated to the law that is breached. A
prominent example of this type of civil disobedience was Gandhi's general program of
disobedience directed at the British in India. See id. at 51-52.
3. The second point is emphasized in King, Jr., Letter from the Birmingham fail,
in ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 61 (R. Goldwin ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as King]. King
says that the purpose of nonviolent direct action (civil disobedience) is to create the
kind of tension or crisis that will lead a community that has previously refused to
negotiate to "confront the issue." Id. at 63-64. The purpose is to dramatize the issue
so that the community cannot continue to ignore it. Id. at 64.
4. See Storing, The Case Against Civil Disobedience, in ON C vL DISOBEDIENCE
96-97 (R. Goldwin ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Storing]. But see FORTAS, supra note
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The advocates of civil disobedience place a moral responsibility on
each individual to disobey laws considered to be unjust.5 In the past
two decades, civil disobedience has been practiced by many, including
civil rights protestors, antiwar groups, and student groups protesting
both university and government policies.
The thesis of this essay is that civil disobedience is destructive of a
regime regarded as fundamentally democratic;6 however, it is also one
of the tactical options, among other more extreme options, available in
a revolution to overthrow a regime regarded as fundamentally undemo-
cratic.
I. Civil Disobedience in Democratic Regimes
A. Which Laws Are "Unjust"
A serious deficiency in the theory seeking to justify civil disobedi-
ence is that it provides no principled basis for deciding which are the
unjust laws. The definitions of just and unjust laws advanced by the
advocates of civil disobedience are generally inadequate.7  The attri-
butes of justice are a subject on which many books-some of them
great-have been written and on which philosophers and scholars disa-
gree. The recent, much acclaimed work by Professor John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice,8 may be criticized for its failure to define the attri-
butes of just and unjust laws. According to Rawls, an advocate of civil
disobedience, not only is the idea of perfect justice "extremely rough,"
but "[t]he measure of departures from the ideal is left importantly to
intuition."9  When, in the chapter on "Duty and Obligation," Rawls
takes up the question of what a just law or policy is, far from adducing
substantive criteria for determining an answer, he involves the citizens in
a public opinion guessing game about what laws or policies most people
1, at 52. Fortas considers testing the legality or constitutionality of a government decree
to be a form of civil disobedience.
5. See King, supra note 3, at 66, who argues that just as each individual has a
legal and moral responsibility to obey just laws, each one has conversely a moral
responsibility to disobey unjust laws.
6. A democratic regime is one in which the majority rules either directly or
through representatives and in which the majority recognizes certain basic rights of the
minority. A regime lacking either or both of these characteristics would be undemocrat-
ic.
7. For example, Dr. King's definitions, because they are so general, provide very
little guidance for specific situations. He states that just laws are consistent with the
moral law, natural law, or the law of God and unjust laws are not. Laws that uplift
human personality are just, and laws that degrade it are unjust. King, supra note 3, at
66.
8. J. RAwLs, A THERY oF JusTIcB (1971).
9. Id. at 246.
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would favor.' 0 Rawls' criteria for determining what is a just law or
policy seem to be devoid of serious guidance for citizens faced with
concrete problems; Rawls' "method" involves speculation about what is
in his view misguided future public opinion. If Rawls, in what is
considered by some to be the most important twentieth century book
about political philosophy and, specifically, about justice, can do no
better than this, it is asking a very great deal that the ordinary citizen
resolve the problem. Indeed, the history of political philosophy can be
seen as a series of fundamental disagreements about the true nature of
justice.
Human perception or understanding of what is just and unjust may
change over time. In the 1950's and 1960's, many American blacks
protested segregation statutes with civil disobedience; only a few years
later, some blacks complained vehemently of the injustice of state laws
and rules forbidding the same kinds of racial discrimination against
which they had directed their earlier civil disobedience. Cornell Uni-
versity, on behalf of its black students, argued against the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare and the New York State Board of Re-
gents that it should be allowed to maintain what was in effect a
segregated student housing facility;" some black groups across the
country have advocated segregated facilities of various kinds.' 2  Wheth-
10. "A law or policy is sufficiently just, or at least not unjust, if when we try to
imagine how the ideal procedure [the conclusion of rational legislators who are 'con-
strained by a just constitution' and who are attempting 'to follow the principles of
justice'] would work out, we conclude that most persons taking part in this procedure and
carrying out its stipulations would favor that law or policy." Id. at 357.
But then Rawls whisks away whatever firm ground this statement provides by
saying: "[We might be tempted to suppose that if many rational persons were to try to
simulate the conditions of the ideal procedure and conducted their reasoning and
discussion accordingly, a large majority anyway would be almost certainly right. This
would be a mistake." Id. at 358.
See Schaefer, The "Sense" and Non-sense of Justice: John Rawls'. A Theory of
Justice, POL. Sci. Rav. (Fall 1973), which argues that Rawls utterly fails to adduce
substantive criteria for judging what are just and unjust laws or policies. Schaefer says
that Rawls' reference to ideal procedure is "mere buck-passing," and that Rawls'
encouragement to individuals to disobey the law "whenever their guesses about the 'ideal
procedure' disagree with the government's" simply encourages anarchy. Id. at 31.
11. Cornell Alumni News, Nov. 1973, at 62-63; id., Feb. 1974, at 56; id., Mar.
1974, at 54; id., Sept. 1976, at 57.
12. See G. ROCHE III, E. VAN DEN HAAG & A. REYNOLDS, Tun BALANCING AcT
121-39 (1974). They note that blacli militants often demanded that whites-students,
faculty, and administrators-be excluided from black studies programs and from black
dormitories and that a number of schools, including Antioch and Cornell, complied with
these demands. Id. at 121.
Moreover, a number of predominantly black groups, which both in court and
elsewhere opposed racial discrimination in education, filed amicus curiae briefs favoring
the use of racial and ethnic quotas in the law school admission process. See, e.g., DEFu-
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er the community should proscribe all forms of racial segregation turns
out, at least for some, to be a very difficult problem indeed.
Some of the most complex questions about the justice of laws arise
when one constitutional right appears to conflict with another. One
such conflict in the United States concerns the freedom of the press
versus the public's ability to prosecute crimes and the suspect's right to
defend himself against a serious charge. The Supreme Court has
decided that reporters have no blanket privilege to withhold information
from grand juries or petit juries;'3 but does this mean that reporters and
editors who believe that this decision is profoundly unjust and wrong
should refuse by acts of civil disobedience to divulge certain kinds of
information in court? Such actions would render the apprehension and
prosecution of certain suspects (in some cases, dangerous and violent
persons who have grievously violated the rights of others) difficult or
impossible and would make it impossible for certain defendants to
present the kind of defense they believe is necessary. After all, it is
often the defense, not the prosecution, that needs subpoenaed infor-
mation from the media. This is a complex problem, especially for those
who endorse civil disobedience in principle. Determining which laws
to obey is awesomely difficult for those who believe that in a
democratic regime citizens may choose the laws they will obey and
disobey.
Ironically, the very issues that often involve civil disobedience are
probably those least susceptible of satisfactory resolution by individuals.
For example, a decision to refuse cooperation with the draft laws in
wartime is complex .and momentous. From the perspective of the
nation's welfare there is no reason to presume that the individual's
judgment is likely to be more correct than that of the Congress or of the
president. Apart from the question of the individual's competence to
decide what is best for the nation, his inescapable concern for his own
safety necessarily prejudices his view of the matter. It is doubtful, in
short, that individuals are competent arbiters in matters affecting them
directly. For John Locke, the point of establishing civil society was to
move men away from a state of nature, its essential defect being that
NIS VERSUS ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY .Ot"WASHINGTON (A. Ginger ed. 1974) (re-
printing briefs filed by the United Negro College Fund, Inc. (id. at 1083), Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (id.), National iUrban League (id.), NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (id. yat 5183), and National Conference of
Black Lawyers (id. at 1205)). It may be argued that the views contained in
these briefs are inconsistent with the opposition qf these groups to racial and ethnic
discrimination.
13. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
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men were judges in their own cases. Civil society was to establish peace
by providing a common judge to settle disputes.14
B. The Historical Perspective
Obedience to law by citizens was an essential ingredient of Ameri-
can constitutional government as such government was seen by Ameri-
ca's Founding Fathers. In The Federalist, No. 15, Alexander Ham-
ilton analyzes the defects of the Articles of Confederation, the most
serious of which is "the principle of legislation for states or governments,
in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished
from the individuals of which they consist."' 5 Because of this and other
defects, the confederation of states had "reached almost the last stage of
national humiliation."'" In defending the new constitution whose laws
would be binding on individuals, Hamilton concluded that the institu-
tion of government is required
[b]ecause the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of
reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that
bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness
than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all
accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is
founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less
active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided
among a number, than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit
of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of
all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are
composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would
blush in a private capacity.17
Thus, Hamilton found that obedience by citizens to government au-
thority, to law, was a crucial means of insuring that individuals conform
to dictates of reason and justice.
Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural address, delivered on March 4,
1801, expresses clearly the citizen's duty to obey the law within the
framework of a constitution that protects his rights while imposing
obligations of obedience to the law. Jefferson states what he under-
stands to be the essential principles of American government, among
which are equal justice for all, "preservation of the general government
in its whole constitutional vigor,"'' 8 care that the right of election by the
people be maintained, and the freedoms of religion, press, and person.
14. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATIsE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 87-89 (1690) [hereinafter
cited as LOCKE].
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 86 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
16. Id. at 84.
17. Id. at 89.
18. THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 386 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
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But the principle laid down by Jefferson of greatest interest here is that
of "absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority-the vital
principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to force, the
vital principle and immediate parent of despotism."' 19 Jefferson's
phrase "absolute acquiescence" is unqualified; it is noteworthy that he
included such a call for obedience to law in what was one of the most
important speeches of his political career.
Perhaps the most eloquent plea for Americans to obey the law was
made by Abraham Lincoln in his address before the Young Men's
Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, on January 27, 1838. In that speech,
Lincoln discussed the increasing tendency in the nation toward law-
lessness and then suggested how the country might protect itself
from this danger:
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well-wisher to
his posterity swear by the blood of the Revolution never to violate
in the least particular the laws of the country, and never to tolerate
their violation by others. As the patriots of seventy-six did to the
support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of
the Constitution and laws let every American pledge his life, his
property, and his sacred honor-let every man remember that to
violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear
the charter of his own and his children's liberty. Let reverence
for the laws be breathed by every American mother to the lisping
babe that prattles on her lap; let it be taught in schools, in semi-
naries, and in colleges; let it be written in primers, spelling-books,
and in almanacs; let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in
legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short,
let it become the political religion of the nation; and let the old
and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay of all
sexes and tongues and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly
upon its altars.20
Then Lincoln discussed the argument for civil disobedience, the argu-
ment that bad or unjust laws need not or should not be obeyed:
When I so pressingly urge a strict observance of all the laws,
let me not be understood as saying there are no bad laws, or that
grievances may not arise for the redress of which no legal provi-
sions have been made. I mean to say no such thing. But I do
mean to say that although bad laws, if they exist, should be re-
pealed as soon as possible, still, while they continue in force, for
the sake of example they should be religiously observed. So also
in unprovided cases. If such arise, let proper legal provisions be
made for them with the least possible delay, but till then let them,
if not too intolerable, be borne with. 21
19. Id.
20. THE LiFE AND WRINGs OF ABRAHm LINCOLN 236-37 (P. Stern ed. 1940).
21. Id. at 237.
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C. The Responsibility of the Minority
Locke, in his Second Treatise of Civil Government, points out that
the decision to form a political community is and must be unanimous,
but that it would be totally unrealistic to expect that all decisions
subsequently made by that community would be unanimous. Because
of the impossibility of continuing unanimity, the laws must be made by
the majority. 22 Inherent in rule by majority is the opposition of a
minority. Civil disobedience and its advocacy are a direct challenge to
the basic democratic principle that the minority must accept the will of
the majority once its recourse to legal procedures has been exhausted.23
Virtually every citizen in a democracy at some time finds himself in the
minority, believing that one or more of the majority's decisions-wheth-
er executive, legislative, or judicial-is unjust. He may find himself in
deep and conscientious disagreement with decisions on war and peace,
integration, busing, "reverse discrimination," abortion, or tax burdens.
If every citizen exercised what advocates of civil disobedience call his
responsibility, with or without a willingness to accept the penalty, and
disregarded laws he believed to be unjust, or other laws, to demonstrate
that belief, the result would be violence, chaos, or civil war-a total
breakdown of the rule of law.24
22. LOCKE, supra note 14, at § 96. Locke argues that the community is constituted
by the consent of the individuals in it. Because it is necessary that the community as one
body move in one direction or another, and because it must choose between conflicting
policies, "it is necessary the Body should move that way whither the greater force carries
it, which is the consent of the majority." Id. (emphasis in original).
23. Id. Locke argues that because no democratic society can exist without the
power to punish the offenses and to preserve the property of those in that society,
democratic society exists only when each of its members has given over to the
community the natural powers he had in the state of nature. "And thus all private
judgement of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be
umpire by settled standing Rules . . . and . . . decides all the differences that may
happen between any members of that society, concerning any matter of right. . . ." Id.
at § 87 (emphasis added). Thus, for Locke, civil disobedience in a democratic society is
not only impractical but also destroys the basis of the regime.
24. "[W]herever and whenever a principled democrat accepts the political system
of democracy, he must accept the binding authority of legislative decisions, reached after
the free give-and-take of debate and discussion as binding upon him, whether he is a
member of the majority or minority. Otherwise the consequence is incipient or overt
anarchy or civil war, the usual preface to despotism . . . ." S. Hook, How Democratic
Is America? A Response to Howard Zinn, in How DEMOCRATIC Is AMEmuCA? 67 (R.
Goldwin ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Hook]. The recent violent difficulties, including
riots, in Boston, Massachusetts and Louisville, Kentucky resulted in substantial part
from the resistance of many whites to court-ordered busing for the purpose of achieving
racial balance. TME, Sept. 22, 1975, at 7-11.
The industrial strikes of the late 1800's and early 1900's, many of them illegal, and
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Even from a less apocalyptic perspective, civil disobedience would
soon become an effective means of retarding or halting the implementa-
tion of any or all public policies if it were practiced on a widespread
basis; in fact, the more general its practice, the more destructive its
effects. Thus, the proponents of civil disobedience are placed in the
untenable position of advocating a form of action whose justification
depends crucially on its rejection by the vast majority of citizens. Yet
Dr. King and other advocates claim that civil disobedience is a moral
responsibility of each citizen.
And what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Civil
disobedience in this country is generally associated with causes that are
loosely labelled liberal, progressive, or radical. But the argument for
civil disobedience would justify the members of school boards who
disagree with court orders of various kinds designed to integrate school
facilities in refusing compliance and would justify the owners of hotels,
motels, restaurants, and other facilities, determined by the courts and by
Congress to serve the public, in refusing service to members of certain
groups (as a matter of conscience, which inpractice means opinion-or
prejudice). The argument for civil disobedience can be made seriously
only because its proponents steadfastly refuse to generalize the principles
implicit in their arguments and actions. Indeed, if citizens opposing
judicial integration orders in the past twenty years had engaged in civil
disobedience on the scale on which it has been employed by the so-
called liberal, progressive, or radical groups, much less progress would
have been made in integrating our society, or a good bit more force and
violence would have been necessary to accomplish the same degree of
integration.25
the often brutal and illegal responses by company managements are characterized in a
prominent history of the United States as "uninterrupted industrial conflict that frequent-
ly broke out into violence and assumed the ominous character of warfare." 2 S.
MoRIsoN, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBURo, THE GROW-H OF THE AMERiCAN
REPUBLIC 92 (6th ed. 1969). For a general discussion of industrial conflict in this
period, see id. at 92-97. Although not political protest and thus not civil disobedience,
these strikes illustrate the consequences of widespread refusal to obey the law by
ordinarily law-abiding citizens who believed that law-abidingness should in this instance
be subordinated to more important considerations.
25. Professor Sidney Hook summarizes this difficulty very well: "On this view,
any group that defies any law that violates its conscience-with respect to marriage,
taxation, vaccination, education-should be encouraged to do so." Hook, supra note 24,
at 68.
Hook sets out limited conditions in which, in his view, civil disobedience may be
justified: "Under carefully guarded provisions, a democrat may resort to civil disobedi-
ence of a properly enacted law in order to bear witness to the depths of his commitment
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The argument can be made that civil disobedience is a self-limiting
phenomenon because only a few will have the courage to face the
accompanying legal penalties. But the penalties for most forms of civil
disobedience are a short period in jail or perhaps a fine 26 -and these in
some circles may bring respect to the person engaged in civil disobedi-
ence. One must question the amount of courage needed for these kinds
of acts. Also, as will be discussed later, as acts of civil disobedience
become more violent and coercive, the tendency to flee the penalty
altogether beomes greater.
Whatever the number of its practitioners, civil disobedience tends
to promote violence in a democratic regime. The possibility that prevail-
ing conditions or perceptions of them may change leaves a significant
potential for violence in a democratic regime. What will the nonviolent
protester do if conditions, in his view, do not improve-or even deterio-
rate-despite (or perhaps because of) his nonviolent civil disobedi-
ence? What course of action directed toward improvement of the
situation is left other than violence? As citizens become increasingly
inured to and perhaps even bored or angered by the tactics of civil
disobedience, acts of civil disobedience will lose their educational or
shock value, citizens will no longer be moved to an examination of the
justice of the protester's cause, and protesters will have to resort to
increasingly coercive and violent methods simply to get attention.2 7
in an effort to reeducate his fellow citizens. But in that case he must ... voluntarily
abandon his violation or noncompliance with law at the point where its consequences
threaten to destroy the democratic process and open the floodgates either to the violent
disorders of anarchy or to the dictatorship of a despot or a minority political party." Id.
at 67.
26. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-253.2, -254.01, -254.3 to .4 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 403, 467c, 408, 409, 647c (West 1970). These sections concern
disorderly conduct in public places, obstructing free passage of others, participating in
unlawful assembly, and remaining at place of riot or unlawful assembly after warning to
disperse, respectively. Persons engaged in civil disobedience are frequently arrested for
and convicted of these offenses, though they are often arrested for commission of other
offenses.
27. The development of the tactics of the Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) from lawful dissent to illegal but non-violent protest and finally to violent protest,
including acts of terror, is well chronicled in E. BAccIocco, JR., THE NEW LEFT IN
AMERICA: REFORM TO REVOLUTION, 1956-1970, chs. 4-7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
BACcIOCCo] and in HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNAL SECURITY, ANATOMY OF A REVOLU-
TIONARY MOVEMENT: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, H.R. REP. No. 1565,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). "From the militant's viewpoint, Columbia was a
triumph because it regenerated SDS, radicalized SDS members and other participating
students, and brought into the open a penchant for violence which until that time had for
the most part been expressed verbally. Mark Rudd epitomized this inclination by
remarking, 'I think everyone should have the right to go and talk to an interviewer, but if
the Dow guy comes, luck him and napalm him.'... In some cases the eagerness to use
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Nothing in the argument for lawbreaking through civil disobedience
necessarily precludes resort to violence if it is deemed necessary to
accomplish a just result. If nonviolent lawbreaking is justifiable given
certain perceptions or conditions, then violent lawbreaking is justified
when those conditions are said not to be operative. Once one thinks
that lawbreaking is justifiable in a democratic regime, once the law-
breaking barrier has been overcome, the decision for or against violence
in that regime is simply a matter of prudential considerations, of tactics.
D. Acceptance of Legal Penalties
Whether those who engage in civil disobedience should be willing
to accept the legal penalty for their lawbreaking has been a perplexing
problem for the advocates of civil disobedience. Some, including Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., advocate acceptance of legal penalties.2 s Other
prominent writers on civil disobedience, however, sharply disagree. Both
Professors Howard Zinn and Ronald Dworkin state that those who
engage in civil disobedience are under no obligation to accept the legal
penalty.29 And in a sense, Zinn and Dworkin are quite right: as
violent rhetoric reflected a willingness to engage in physical violence, as illustrated by
the future SDS faction called the Weathermen in 1969 (Mark Rudd became a Weather-
man)." BAccIocco, supra, at 205.
An examination of the biographies of a substantial number of radicals evinces
the same development from illegal but nonviolent forms of protest to violence. For
example, Stokely Carmichael was incarcerated 35 times for nonviolent offenses in the
cause of civil rights. But then his rhetoric turned to calls for violent revolution.
CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 66, 67 (1970). Carmichael was later convicted of incitement to
riot. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7,-1972, at 52, col. 3.
28. Dr. King advocated voluntary acceptance of legal penalties on the ground that
a person who accepts the legal penalty in order to arouse the conscience of the
community about an alleged injustice "is in reality expressing the highest respect for
law." King, supra note 3, at 67.
29. H. ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 27-31 (1968). Zinn examines nine
fallacies concerning law and order, the second of which is that "the person who commits
civil disobedience must accept his punishment as right." Id. at 27. He argues that quiet
acceptance by citizens of government injustice perpetuates the idea that citizens must
tolerate such injustices by the government. If the protest is morally justified, Zinn
argues, then "it is morally justified to the very end, even past the point where a court has
imposed a penalty." Id. at 30. If protest stops when a court imposes a penalty, then we
are treating social protest like a football game in which good sportsmanship dictates that
the verdict be more or less cheerfully accepted. Zinn argues that such an attitude
demeans social protest. Finally, Zinn argues that a protest cannot be potent if it "stops
dead in its tracks as soon as the very government it is criticizing decides against it." Id.
at 30.
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, NEw YORK REvIEw OF BooKs, Dec. 7, 1970,
at 23-31, advises persons who engage in civil disobedience to flee from the authorities, as
Reverend Daniel Berrigan did recently until the F.B.I. caught up with him. Dworkin
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Professor Herbert Storing has pointed out, the usual manifestation of
respect for law by citizens is obedience; if citizens need not obey the law
to show respect for it, why is it necessary for them to accept the law's
penalty to show that respect?30 Thus, Dr. King's argument that ac-
cepting the penalty is a logically necessary component of civil disobedi-
ence seems to be hard to sustain.
Aside from the conclusion that accepting the legal penalty seems
not to be a logically necessary component of civil disobedience, it
appears unlikely that willingness to accept the penalty will remain a
meaningful ingredient of civil disobedience.
But are we so sure that we can enforce this rule [that the lawbreaker
must willingly accept his punishment], as the teaching of disobe-
dience extends through the populace, especially the desperately
poor, the degraded, and the bitter? Despite some outstanding suc-
cesses in limited areas under special circumstances, I think it is now
clear-as it should have been from the beginning-that the broad
result of the propagation of civil disobedience is disobedience.
The question then becomes whether the encouragement of dis-
obedience endangers law and civil society, and the answer seems
clear enough today, if it was ever in doubt, that it does. 31
Obedience to law for most is not something that can be practiced on a
selective basis according to conscience without having conscience ulti-
mately subordinated to interest and desire. A fundamental reason for
law, the control of individuals' unjust self-preferences, constitutes an
important rationale for respecting and obeying the law.32
In fact, civil disobedience seems likely to become a formula for
ever-increasing violence. As discussed earlier, acts of civil disobedience
themselves have a tendency to become increasingly violent. As a result,
the legal penalties for such acts will escalate in severity; persons facing
serious legal sanctions that may deprive them of their liberty for extend-
ed periods of time are less likely to accept willingly the verdict of the law
than those whose violations are regarded as relatively minor infractions.
After all, it is one thing to pay a fine or spend a few days in jail,
argues that if a man is convinced that he has a right to demonstrate, then he must be
similarly convinced that the government would be wrong to stop him. And if this is so,
then "it is silly to speak of a duty to obey the law as such, or of a duty to accept the
punishment that the state has no right to give." Id. at 25. See also R. Dworkin, On Not
Prosecuting Civil Disobedience, NEW YoRK REvvmw oF BooKs, June 6, 1968, at 14-21.
30. Storing, supra note 4, at 104.
31. Id. at 103-04.
32. Aius'rOLF, POLrtCS § 1269a, lines 20-27, discusses obedience to law as
depending on habit. He says that the law has no power to command obedience except
that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to
new laws enfeebles the power of the law.
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and quite another to face the prospect of long periods of incar-
ceration. Thus, as the legal penalties for increasingly coercive or
violent acts of civil disobedience escalate, a willingness on the part of the
protestors to accept the legal penalties becomes less likely.
E. No Inherent Self-Limitation
There is a final difficulty with civil disobedience: Which laws and
how many may be broken in civil disobedience? Once it is claimed, as
most of the proponents of civil disobedience do, that the law broken
need not be the one protested, then certain questions arise: Which
laws may be broken? May more than one law be broken? Perhaps
many? May a citizen refuse compliance with all laws-or at least
the ones he claims he can break nonviolently-until the claimed
injustices are rectified? Nowhere do the proponents of civil disobedi-
ence give a satisfactory answer to this problem; until they do, civil
disobedience is a doctrine in search of limits.
As noted above, the advocates of civil disobedience regard it as a
moral responsibility. But the fatal difficulty in the argument when
applied to governments that operate by majority rule is that the effec-
tiveness and continuance of the regime requires that individuals divest
themselves of authority to judge which enacted laws are sufficiently just
to warrant obedience. If the regime is worth maintaining and preserv-
ing, then civil disobedience is unjustifiable because it undermines the
fundamental principles of the regime. Nothing in this essay denies that
democratic regimes can and do enact unjust laws. The argument here
is that when they do, the citizen who truly supports such a regime must
use legal means to seek change in the law.
H. Civil Disobedience in Undemocratic Regimes
What, on the other hand, of a regime which is itself not democrat-
ic? The Reverend Daniel Berrigan has characterized the American
regime as murderous and absolutely corrupt and proposed civil disobe-
dience as a response. Professor Walter Berns writes of this characteri-
zation:
The situation is hopeless, [Berrigan] says, and he proposes the
"desperate" remedy of a ceremonial breaking of the law. As if
Count von Stauffenberg, instead of placing that bomb at Hitler's
feet, had set fire to a Third Reich draft card and said, "Take that,
mein Fuehrer!"
What sort of sentimental nonsense is this that tells a man to be
civil . . . to a government he regards as absolutely corrupt?
[Vol. 3
Jefferson and his colleagues at the beginning were not being civil
in their disobedience to British authorities; they were killing British
soldiers, and they knew what would happen to them if they lost
the war. .... 33
It does not detract from Berns's argument to point out that there are a
limited number of situations, such as that of British rule over Gandhi's
India, in which civil disobedience may be one appropriate means,
among others, for overthrowing a regime regarded as undemocratic; but
here civil disobedience is a tool of revolution against an undemocratic
regime. Thus, civil disobedience is one of the tactical options, among
other more extreme options, available in revolution against a regime
regarded as fundamentally undemocratic, but is, as argued above,
destructive of a regime regarded as fundamentally democratic. 34
Conclusion
There are those who argue that civil disobedience has been effec-
tive, at least in America, in speeding "desirable" social change. Yet
there are many illegal, coercive, or violent methods that, it could be
argued, would bring about desired changes but that we nonetheless
condemn. The end does not in itself justify any means directed toward
its attainment.
The search for justice through civil disobedience may well be a
formula for tyranny, for according to Locke, men enter society in order
to be governed by known, settled laws.35  If the law-abiding majority
increasingly has the impression that there is no such law or that it is not
being enforced, it may choose rulers who will take law enforcement
more seriously, to say nothing of building an Autobahn and making the
trains run on time.
33. Berns, The "Essential Soul" of Daniel Berrigan, NATIONAL REVIEW, Nov. 9,
1973, at 1231, 1240.
34. While it is outside the scope of this essay to argue the point at length, this
author finds the evidence overwhelming that the United States is fundamentally demo-
cratic. The people exercise control over the formulation and content of public policy
through their representatives, and basic civil rights and liberties, while always a subject
of controversy, are firmly established. The American regime has shown a substantial
capacity for remedying wrongs, whether these concern segregation, political corruption,
the environment, or legal representation for the indigent. Many of the dilemmas facing
the country today are difficult to resolve, not because the regime is undemocratic, but
because important public interests must be subordinated to other even more important
interests whenever a policy is made (as with environmental decisions) or because
majority opinions or desires conflict with rights asserted by minorities (as with busing or
"welfare rights"). Because the United States is fundamentally democratic, civil disobedi-
ence is not justified here.
35. Locan, supra note 14, at § 87.
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